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The ecological ideal of ‘sustainability’ is defensible, but controversial. It valorises a certain way of 
inhabiting the world not by defining it directly, but by imagining its perpetual reproduction. I 
argue that what sustainability offers us is a way of being nostalgic for the future. The sustainable 
present will become our true home because it is the point to which the future will always recur; we 
look nostalgically to the future because it is there that the present will be inhabited as our home. 
Nostalgic imaginings are not, then, just a regulative ideal for ecological praxis. Nostalgia is called 
upon as an ethical principle, and the characteristics of this memory-work will affect the shape of 
our future.  
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Since the 1970s, ‘sustainability’ – understood broadly in relation to environmental and social 
planning – has been transformed from a semi-technical term in forestry and agricultural science 
(Newton and Freyfogle, 2005: 24) into the most characteristic ethical imperative of the present 
moment. In the face of ecological crisis, to live in a morally responsible way has largely come to 
indicate: to live sustainably. The very widespread use of the word (and of ‘sustainable 
development’ or, increasingly, ‘sustainable living’) might be attributed to its vagueness, making it 
a conveniently empty term for co-option by mainstream capitalism. On the other hand, it might be 
regarded as articulating successfully a constellation of important environmental desiderata in a 
way that has broad intuitive appeal (Lélé, 1991; Jacobs, 1999). Sustainability appears somehow to 
be both a partisan ecological demand and an a priori good: it is striking that it is very often taken 
for granted that in any given field, a ‘sustainable’ approach is better than a non-sustainable one. 
Perhaps the concept can have this dual status not just because it is a meaningless branding tool nor 
just because it is innately morally compelling, but partly through a kind of category error. An 
argument or proposition needs to be sustainable in order to be right. If the available premises do 
not sustain the conclusion, then it is a failure. But to say that the same is true of ways of living or 
sets of social relations would be to presuppose the very connection between sustainability and 
rightness — moral rightness, in this case — that proponents of sustainable development try to 
prove. For ways of living, to be unsustainable or self-defeating in the final analysis is not 
necessarily the same thing as being erroneous. A certain lack of clarity in distinguishing between 




We should be wary, then, of signing up to ‘sustainability’ without defining it more precisely. The 
central issue is often taken to be the problem of what exactly we should try to sustain: we must 
choose between preserving kinds or degrees of opportunities for personal fulfilment, aggregate or 
per capita utility, presently existing resources, and any number of alternative, sometimes 
incompatible, goods (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier, 1989). Yet perhaps a still more fundamental 
question concerns the nature of the act of sustaining as such. The most influential definition of 
sustainable development by far remains the one proposed by the so-called Brundtland report: 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987: 43). One striking feature of this undoubtedly valuable description is the sharp division that it 
implies between ‘the present’ and ‘future generations’. For Gro Harlem Brundtland, and for many 
of those who have followed her, sustainability yokes together the needs for intragenerational and 
intergenerational justice. In order to do so, it must first distinguish one from the other, describing 
ourselves and our descendants as two clearly distinct moral communities. The ethical and political 
usefulness of sustainability has been said to turn on this ability to pick out our duty of care to an 
unborn other. 
This is probably not the most natural way of understanding the term. What ‘sustainability’ implies 
most readily is not separation but continuity, the keeping of things as they are and the diminution 
of the otherness of the future. A sustainable way of life is one that is self-reinforcing, one that is 
able to reproduce its essential features indefinitely. It is not the case that sustainability is 
concerned only with the rights of the unborn. On the contrary: 
a significant part (to say the least) of the global environmental agenda is driven by the 
perceived requirements of large-scale transnational business sectors to secure necessary 
legal, socio-political and ecological conditions for continued capital accumulation. This is, 
for them, the core meaning of ‘sustainable development’. (Benton, 1999: 220) 
Sustainability seeks to enable us to predict and determine the future. It subordinates change to 
itself, saturating the future with the present. It does not require pure repetition: it is not essential to 
a sustainable transport programme, for instance, that today we rely exclusively on a transport 
system that could be used indefinitely far into the future. What it does require is that we put in 
place a programme of research into engine technology, and targets for progressive reductions in 
emissions, such that the means by which some notional final state can be achieved are already 
present and only need to be worked through according to their own rules.  
Sustainable living often operates on a micrological scale of thermostats and recycling bins, but its 
orientation is utopian: it envisages the transcendence of time and an escape from history. It 
responds to the threat of environmental apocalypse by offering us the infinite postponement of 
loss. It appeals to the possibility of the sheer unlimited reproduction of social arrangements as a 
way of legitimating them. Whereas Nietzsche’s demon of eternal recurrence confronts us with the 
demand to value a single life so highly that we could delight in its infinite repetition (Nietzsche, 
2001: §341), sustainability’s first instinct is to dissociate itself from that life to the point where its 
indefinite prolongation is required as a way of justifying it. Other rules can easily be bolted on to 
the primary structure, so that sustainable development can imply an obligation to meet the basic 
needs of the poor, for instance, but sustainability does not in itself describe any positive content 
that the present must have. It seeks only the victory of sameness over the illimitable newness of 
what is to come. The survival of species-being becomes an apotheosis. A stricter and less idealistic 
definition than Brundtland’s might read: sustainable development is development that does not 
undermine its own conditions of possibility. 
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On these grounds and others, some within the environmental movement have levelled a broad and 
fierce attack against the rhetoric of sustainability, even to the extent of calling for the term to be 
abandoned altogether. It might imply a regressive, arrogant economism that regards humans as the 
world’s sole agents, maximising the flow of ‘resources’ from nature (Newton and Freyfogle, 
2005). Conversely, it might indicate an old-fashioned idea of enduring organic harmony, one that 
has been ‘discredited by a “postmodern ecology” that emphasises flux and contingency’ (Parham, 
2008: 25; see Botkin, 1990). The pursuit of sustainability may be counterproductive in 
conservation work, leading us astray from cautious resource management and towards impractical 
grand solutions (Ludwig et al., 1993). For John O’Grady (2003: 3), ‘its privileging of duration or 
permanence as a value’ contradicts the ancient Heraclitean principle that everything in nature is in 
flux; ‘[c]onsidered in this light, there is no ecological justification for the idea of sustainability’. 
Despite all this, I do not share the conviction that sustainability is a misguided or unwelcome goal 
for the environmental movement. It is by no means clear that any alternative could match even the 
limited political efficacy that sustainability has proved to possess. Moreover, the admittedly 
curious idea that we should try to make the future in some way continuous with the present might 
have its own ethical advantages. The slippage between the two senses of the ‘sustainable’, logical 
consistency and physical endurance, might be productive rather than misleading. We might make 
it our goal to adopt a way of life that would avoid obvious self-contradiction or inevitable 
obsolescence even if it was adopted universally, and we might do so in the full knowledge that the 
more coherent our project, the more readily it will lend itself to radical revaluation and 
redefinition by future ages. In this way, sustainability might even become a way of reckoning with 
and welcoming the perpetual openness of complex chaotic systems to unexpected new judgments 
and configurations. There are good reasons for doubting that we can or should abandon the goal of 
sustainability; instead, we should try to reformulate it in a way that attends to the problematic 
implications of its desire for permanence. 
Sustainability describes the search for a form of collective continuity at the level of popular 
culture and behaviour. As such, it is squarely within the field of inquiry that has been taken up by 
memory studies, and conceptualising the pursuit of sustainability as a kind of memory-work offers 
us a new way to think about it. The dream of sustainability, I want to argue, is a nostalgia for the 
future. Its fundamental desire is precisely that which the nostalgic yearns for: a stable home, free 
from the losses of time. Sustainability defines the present time and present way of life as a 
satisfactory home — satisfactory ethically, emotionally, culturally and politically — by positing it 
as the place to which the future will always recur. The future will be sustained by the systems that 
we have put in place, and its inhabitants will look back to the present era of newly sustainable 
living as the objective origin of their successful dwelling in the world. They will be nostalgic for 
the past, but their situation will be different from ours in that they will always be able to satisfy 
their nostalgia because nothing essential (no irreplaceable biological resources, in the jargon) will 
have been lost. For now, though, we in the present must look nostalgically to the future, because it 
is in the future that the present will be inhabited as our home. The sustainable present becomes the 
end-point of the future life that will validate our own by coinciding with it. Living sustainably, we 
will use our resources in a new way that will let us experience them as intuitively familiar and not 
compromised by the passing of time. The emotional appeal of sustainability is precisely that of 
coming home. 
Nostalgia becomes a utopian environmental and social programme. Nostos, homecoming, 
describes the unlimited recuperation or layering of the present that will enable us to experience it 
as definitively our home; algos, suffering, describes the critical work and the material renunciation 
that are needed for that sustainable habitation to begin. If it is true that one of the characteristic 
qualities of postmodernity has been an elusive yet pervasive feeling of dislocation and anomie, 
such that Western culture in the late twentieth century was struck by a generalised and indefinable 
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feeling of nostalgia (Lowenthal, 1985; Jameson, 1991), then ecological crisis is the way in which 
this cultural malaise is experienced as a material problem by the 21st century. Our universal 
homelessness is no longer transcendent, but produced by the corruption of our habitat. The threat 
of a nostalgia that cannot be satisfied now stems from the danger that we will permanently 
obliterate our dwellings, and leave ourselves with an impossible longing for clean land, air and 
water. The solution is not just a re-imagining of the cultural experience of home, but a 
preservation and restoration of its physical characteristics. Thus, ecology transforms nostalgia, and 
nostalgia is offered as the only basis for ecologically sound living, albeit with an unnerving lack of 
awareness that that is what is being done. The intimate connection between the two is no surprise, 
because it is present in the words themselves. The oikos, the dwelling-place, functions here as the 
home to which the nostos is a return. 
Sustainability offers us a nostalgia for the future, but this is not the most obvious connection 
between nostalgia and environmentalism. Nostalgic appeals to what we have lost can be one of the 
most potent rhetorical tools for green politics. Conversely, one of the most wounding attacks that 
can be made upon ecological advocacy is that it is merely nostalgic, in the sense of being anti-
technological, resistant to progress and to civilization. It is wounding, of course, because it is 
sometimes true. In recent years, ecological cultural criticism has developed partly through a 
process of identifying and repudiating its own nostalgic assumptions. Indeed, this might well be 
regarded as the principal impetus behind the ongoing ‘second wave’ in ecocriticism, which claims 
to identify a debilitating essentialism in the way earlier criticism sought to record and recover an 
experience of truly human ‘placehood’, supposedly endangered by the encroachment of abstract 
modern ‘space’ (Buell, 2005). The ‘constant elegy for a lost unalienated state’ offered by an 
analysis that has not freed itself from nostalgia, writes Timothy Morton (2007: 23), ‘is like 
scratching an itch that doesn’t exist — thereby bringing it into existence’. In a different tradition, 
Jonathan Bate proposes an environmentalist or light green ecopoetics that he distinguishes from 
biocentric deep ecology with the interesting claim that environmentalists value nostalgia as a 
technique of allegory, whereas deep ecologists make the mistake of taking it literally. The desire 
of the latter to get away from anthropocentrism is doomed to failure, but environmentalists share 
their fantasy of the non-instrumental use of reason. Indeed, ‘our survival as a species’ may depend 
upon ‘thought-experiments and language-experiments which imagine a return to nature, a 
reintegration of the human and the Other’. The difference is that for Bate, this must remain ‘a 
dream’: a space of representation, allegory and play from which our lucid selves maintain a 
critical distance (Bate, 2001: 36-8). 
In short, environmental criticism characteristically desires to keep nostalgia at arm’s length. The 
only nostalgia that can have a place in ecocriticism is the rigorously critical and rational kind: ‘a 
nostalgia conscious of itself, a lucid and remorseless dissatisfaction with the present on the 
grounds of some remembered plenitude’ (Jameson, 1971: 82), or, at best, a ‘“productive 
nostalgia”’ that is ‘embodied and enacted in practice’, in an actual return to a defined earlier state 
(Blunt, 2003: 722). In either case, immersion in nostalgic imaginings must be fended off. The use 
of nostalgia, on this mindset, is as a resource for argument rather than as a mode of thought, and 
being exposed as a nostalgist is something to be feared. But I have suggested that ecocriticism 
cannot and does not keep nostalgia at a safe distance in this way. If it describes its preferred future 
in terms of sustainability, as apparently it must, then environmentalism enters into nostalgia, and 
the characteristics of nostalgic thinking will affect the shape of that future. The question is not 
‘how can ecological writing exploit nostalgia?’ but ‘how must ecotheory reflect upon and 
negotiate its own ineliminable, motivating desire for the coincidence of self and dwelling-place?’ 
In working towards an answer to this question, we might begin by seeing what materials we can 
draw from the already existing tradition of theorising about nostalgia. The single most influential 
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recent intervention in nostalgia studies has been made by Svetlana Boym, but the brilliantly 
articulated distinction between ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia that underpins her work 
proves to break down under conditions of ecological crisis. Reflective nostalgia is an émigré 
aesthetic that ‘dwells in algia, in longing and loss, the imperfect process of remembrance’; it is a 
savouring of shattered fragments, ‘ironic, inconclusive and fragmentary’ (Boym, 2001: 41, 50). 
But that irony presupposes implicitly an enduring groundwork of natural beauty and plenitude 
against which the transience of human artefacts can be measured and found absurd. If the 
fragmentation and decay is environmental, and extends to the realm of biological substance from 
which the self too is formed, then there are no more detached perspectives from which to view the 
comedy of the world. ‘Restorative’ nostalgia is for Boym something paranoid and reactionary, a 
literal-minded attempt to preserve an illusory wholeness just as it slips away from view. Its 
adherents do not realise that they are being nostalgic, any more than do the environmentalists who 
defend sustainability on unsentimental humanitarian grounds. Full-spectrum ecological crisis, 
though, turns the literalism that Boym condemns into the means by which civilization protects 
itself, and elementary moral commitment demands something closer to ‘restorative’ nostalgia than 
to arch ‘reflection’. 
Susan Stewart’s formulations might be more helpful under these conditions, because for her 
nostalgic desire is always both sceptical or critical and naïve or utopian. The nostalgic denies the 
gap between sign and signified that is the very condition of narrative, and seeks to imagine an 
alternative kind of narrative in which desire is not marked by the necessity of absence. In the same 
way, the narrative of human progress that is kept within the bounds of sustainable development 
will free itself from the threat of irreversible loss, guaranteeing for itself the constant presence of 
its own material basis. ‘The prevailing motif of nostalgia’, Stewart writes (1993: 23), ‘is the 
erasure of the gap between nature and culture, and hence a return to the utopia of biology and 
symbol reunited within the walled city of the maternal’. This reunification of culture with biology 
is precisely what is promised by sustainability when it tells us that fundamental biological reality, 
the planet’s ‘carrying capacity’, will be taken up consciously as the frame or presupposition within 
which all human projects will be pursued. Culture will allow itself to be determined by the 
demands of nature. The implication of Stewart’s thought for our understanding of sustainability is 
to encourage us to tolerate it as an ideal even as we recognise it to be a form of nostalgia. On her 
analysis the nostalgic suffers acutely from the desire for an authenticity of origin that is common 
in some degree to us all. In effect, sustainability articulates a universal longing that we cannot 
abandon, even though we will never be able to fulfil it completely. 
Or perhaps we should look back much earlier. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nostalgia 
was principally a medical pathology, a specific physical illness that affected people displaced from 
their homes and that was the province of doctors rather than cultural theorists. Then, as now in the 
case of sustainability, it was a matter of life and death, rooted in the question of how rightly to 
inhabit the land and connected closely to the progress of technology (improvements in 
transportation might spread the disease, or alleviate it). Moreover, the medical history of nostalgia 
tells us that it has always been political. As a condition notorious for causing the desertion of 
soldiers, it could reveal national weakness and incapacity (Starobinski, 1966; O’Sullivan 2006), 
but it could also justify pride in one’s homeland, for a country that could provoke nostalgia was 
proved to command patriotic feeling. ‘Political nostalgia’, writes Michael Roth, ‘was  
an expression of the refusal to feel at home in an unjust political regime’, and as an  
illness caused directly by the loss of liberty it could manifest itself as a violent, instinctive  
refusal of the existing order. ‘[T]he disease of nostalgia is rooted in facets of our humanity  
whose “cure” would leave us deeply impoverished, even horribly mutilated’ (Roth,  
1991: 15, 19). Yet Roth also describes the pathological docility of nostalgic patients,  
their quiescent retreat from the world to nurse in secret the sorrow that destroyed them.  
267 
 
This passivity can stand as a warning that the sustainable life too might become a hermetic 
withdrawal or even a form of nihilism, transforming life into a deathly stasis. To identify 
sustainability as a form of nostalgia is not to dismiss its relevance, but to indicate that it can take 
up any one of a number of vividly contrasting positions on the need for social change. 
For Johannes Hofer, whose celebrated 1688 dissertation coined the word, the disease of nostalgia 
took the form of a neurotic concentration on the material and the bodily. He described it as a 
‘continuous quasi-ecstasy of the mind’ whereby the idea of the fatherland imprints itself at the 
centre of the brain and overpowers the flow of animal spirits. Nostalgia occurs ‘[w]hen, in truth, 
the mind is able to fancy nothing except of the flesh, and it turns itself to the body by imagination 
and it observes the image of the physical object’ (Hofer, 1934[1688]: 387, 384). Since its very 
emergence, then, the greatest danger posed by the condition has been the way it immerses its 
victims too deeply in bodily experience and a single desire, at the cost of the balanced attention to 
a variety of ends that is needed for functioning existence.  
The risk for sustainability is that it too, if not adequately formulated, will find itself able to fancy 
nothing except of the flesh. Without a pragmatic insistence that we can to some extent predict and 
indeed influence the physical and moral demands of future generations (we must believe that they 
will still care about rainforests, for instance), sustainability becomes indistinguishable from the 
business-as-usual pursuit of economic growth (Norton, 2005: 317-40). Yet this necessary 
pragmatism is extremely hard to separate in practice from the assumption that the desires of our 
descendants will be determined by just the same forms of bodily want as we have ourselves. The 
history of nostalgia warns us that this search for a framing commonality of felt experience can 
very rapidly become an overpowering and obsessive focus on fundamental physical needs to the 
exclusion of other goals. Nostalgia can be above all else the erasure of value pluralism, and the 
problem faced by sustainability is to give an account of its ethical project that cannot be confined 
to its own first principles in this way. Sustainable living needs to become a means of allowing 
complex bundles of potentially incompatible goals to emerge and be pursued freely through time; 
any explicit focus on preserving life as it is lived now might even be directly self-defeating. The 
transformation of nostalgia from a life-threatening illness into a global ethical programme is itself 
an example of the kind of radical shifts in outlook that sustainability must constantly make sure it 
does not disavow. 
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